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Identifying the bottom line after a stock market crash
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Abstract In this empirical paper we show that in the months following a crash there is a distinct
connection between the fall of stock prices and the increase in the range of interest rates for a sample
of bonds. This variable, which is often referred to as the interest rate spread variable, can be consid-
ered as a statistical measure for the disparity in lenders’ opinions about the future; in other words,
it provides an operational definition of the uncertainty faced by economic agents. The observation
that there is a strong negative correlation between stock prices and the spread variable relies on the
examination of 8 major crashes in the United States between 1857 and 1987. That relationship which
has remained valid for one and a half century in spite of important changes in the organization of
financial markets can be of interest in the perspective of Monte Carlo simulations of stock markets.
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1 Stock prices and interest rates
In this paper we show that in the time interval between crash and recovery there is a clear relationship
between price variations and the dispersion of interest rates for bonds of different grades (see below),
i.e. what is usually called the interest rate spread. Before explaining this relationship in more detail
let us emphasize that it was observed empirically from the mid-nineteenth century to the latest major
crash in 1987. This is in strong contrast with so many “regularities” which are dependent upon specific
business circumstances. Such is for instance the case of the interest rate itself.
Because of the close connection between stock and bond markets one would expect a strong link
between stock prices and interest rates. This is not the case however; there seems to be no permanent
relationship between these variables; see in this respect the conclusions of [13] and [18, p.241]. It
is true that sometimes a slight decrease in interest rates, by changing the “mood” of the market,
suffices to send prices upward. Thus, in the fall of 1998 three successive quarter point decreases of
the federal-fund rate (that is to say a global -0.75%) stopped the fall of the prices and brought about a
rally. In other circumstances, however, even a huge drop in interest rates is unable to stop the fall of
stock prices; an example is provided by the period from January 1930 to May 1931 when the interest
rate fell from 6% to 2% without any effect on the level of stock prices; similarly in the aftermath of
the 1990 crash of the Japanese stock market interest rates went down to almost zero percent without
bringing about any recovery.
One should not be surprised by the changing relationship between stock price levels and interest rates.
Something similar can be observed in meteorology: sometimes a small fall in temperature is sufficient
to produce rain, while in other circumstances a huge fall in temperature will not give any rain. In this
case we know that the phenomenon has something to do with the hygrometric degree of the air; in the
case of the stock market we do not really know which one of the many other variables plays the crucial
role. In the light of such changing patterns the fact that the relationship between stock prices and the
spread variable appears to be so robust and so stable in the course of time is worthy of attention.
2 Interest rate spread and uncertainty
It is a common saying that “markets dislike and fear uncertainty”. In a strong bull market there is
little uncertainty; for everybody the word of the day is “full steam ahead”. The situation is completely
different after a crash. There is uncertainty about the duration of the bear market; some would think
that it will be short while others expect a long crisis. In 1990 when the bubble burst on the Tokyo
stock market only few people would probably have expected the crisis to last for almost ten years.
There is also uncertainty about which sectors will be the first to emerge from the turbulence: banks
or investment funds, property funds or technology industry, etc.
As we know the interest rate represents the price a company pays to buy money for the future. The
more uncertain the future, the riskier the investment, the higher the interest rate. We will indeed see
that during recessions interest rates often (but not always) show an upward trend. In addition, and
this is probably even more important, the increased uncertainty produces greater disparity in the rate
of different loans. This uncertainty has different sources (i)those who expect a short crisis will be
tempted to lend at lower rates than those who fear a protracted recession (ii) the fact that there is no
longer any “leading force” in the economy obscures expectations; therefore it becomes more difficult
to make a reliable risk assessment for low-quality borrowers (representing the so-called low-grade
bonds).
In short, the interest rate spread gives us a means to probe the mood, expectations and forecasts of
managers, a means which is probably more reliable than the standard confidence indexes obtained
from surveys (in this respect see the last section).
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Although in many econophysical models of the stock market [3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 16] interest rates do not
play a role per se, the fact that uncertainty is greater in the downward phase of the speculative cycle
than in the upward phase could be built into the models by adjusting the randomness of the stochastic
variables used in Monte Carlo simulations. In contrast, interest rates usually play a determinant role
in econometric models. A particularly attractive model of that kind is the Levy-Levy-Solomon model;
it describes the stock and bond markets as communicating vessels and how traders switch from one
to the other. The book by Oliveira et al. [12, chapter 4] details the assumptions of the model, and,
through simulations, explains how it works and to which results it leads.
3 The data
Monthly stock price data going back into the 19th century can be found fairly easily; possible sources
are [4, 8, 17]. Measuring interest rate spreads is a more difficult matter. To begin with it is not obvious
which estimates should be used. The primary source about bond rates is [8]; furthermore a procedure
for constructing the spread measure was proposed in [11]. As a matter of fact Mishkin’s stimulating
paper provided the main incentive for the writing of the present paper. Mishkin proposed to represent
the spread by the difference between the one-fourth of the bonds of the lowest grade (i.e. high rates)
and the one-fourth of the bonds of the best grade (i.e. low rates). It turns out that even for the mid-
nineteenth century Macaulay’s data provided at least three bonds in each of these classes which is
fairly sufficient to give acceptable accuracy; for the more recent period 1888-1935 there are as many
as 10 bonds in each “quartile”. For post-World War II crashes, Macaulay’s series can be prolonged
by the data in [1]. More detailed comments about how these two measures compare can be found in
[11]
4 Results
4.1 Connection between share prices and interest rate spread between crash
and recovery
Fig.1a and 1b show the evolution of stock prices (thick solid line), interest rate spread (thick dashed
line), and interest rate (thin dashed line) for 8 major crashes. The left-hand vertical scale is the same
for all graphs except 1929: this allows a visual comparison of the crashes’ severity. The right-hand
vertical scales although not identical (which was not possible due to different orders of magnitude) are
nevertheless comparable in the sense that the overall range ymax/ymin is the same (except again for
1929); this allows a visual comparison of the increase of the spread. The horizontal scales represent
the number of months after the crash; these scales are the same for all graphs (with the exception of
1929); this allows a comparison of the time elapsed between crash and recovery.
It can be seen that the decline in stock prices is mirrored in a similar increase in interest rate spread.
As a matter of fact the chronological coincidence between the troughs of the stock prices and the
peaks of the spread variable is astonishing. Even for the 1929-1932 episode for which there is a
30-month span between crash and recovery the peak for the spread variable coincides almost to the
month with the end of the price fall.
The connection between both variables is confirmed by the correlation coefficients (left-hand correla-
tions in Fig.1): they are all negative and comprised between −0.64 and −0.94; note that the smallest
correlation (−0.64) corresponds to a relatively small crash with a fall in stock prices of less than 20%.
For 19th century episodes the interest rate changes are more or less in the same direction as those of
the spread variable; however the correlations with stock prices (right-hand correlations in Fig.1) are
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substantially lower. For 20th century episodes the picture changes completely: the interest rate no
longer moves in the same direction as the spread variable; consequently these correlations become
completely random in contrast to the correlations between stock prices and spread variable which
remain close to −1. In the interpretative framework that we developed above we come up with the
following picture. After a crash uncertainty, doubts and apprehension begin to spread throughout the
market; usually (leaving 1929 apart for the moment) the fall last about 10 months; during that time,
uncertainty continues to increase. Then, suddenly, within one month, the trend shifts in the opposite
direction: price begin to increase and uncertainty to subside.
One may wonder how the spread variable behaved in the bull phases. First of all one should note
that not all the crashes that we examined were preceded by a wild bull market; so we concentrate
here on three typical bull markets that occurred in 1904-1907, 1921-1929 and 1985-1987. During
these periods the spread variable remained almost unchanged. Similarly during the period 1950-1967
which was marked by a considerable increase in stock prices (without however being followed by a
major crash) the spread variable remained at a fairly constant level of 1.5%. In contrast during the
period 1968-1979 which was marked by a downward trend in stock prices the spread variable was
substantially larger in the range 2.5% -3.8%.
A simple look at the charts in Fig.1 confirms what we already know, namely that the crisis of 1929-
1932 was quite exceptional. This is of course obvious in economic terms (unemployment, drop in
industrial production, etc.); it is also true from a purely financial perspective. Stock prices plum-
meted from a level 100 to less than 20, and the spread variable increased from 2.5% to almost 8%,
a three-fold increase. For other episodes (see table 1) the corresponding ratios are all below 1.85.
As an illustration of the intensity of the financial crisis one can mention the fact that November and
December 1929 saw the failure of 608 banks; the crisis continued in subsequent months to the extent
that in March 1933 one third of all American banks had disappeared ([11]).
Table 1 Stock price changes versus increase in interest rate spread
Year Stock price Interest rate spread
of crash fall increase
Aprice Aspread
1857 1.63 1.46
1873 1.24 1.32
1890 1.23 1.09
1893 1.34 1.38
1906 1.46 1.82
1929 6.12 3.05
1937 1.89 1.82
1987 1.40 1.25
where:
Aprice = peak price / minimum price, Aspread = maximum spread / initial spread
If we leave 1929 apart the fall/increase ratios of the two variables are almost of the same magnitude;
a linear fit gives:
Aprice = αAspread + β
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with: α = 0.63± 0.50, β = 0.54± 0.13, the correlation is equal to r = 0.74 (confidence interval for
r to probability 0.95 is 0. to 0.96).
If we include 1929 in the sample the coefficients of the linear fit change completely and become:
α = 2.53±0.67, β = −2.11±0.39, with a correlation equal to 0.96 (confidence interval to probability
0.95 is 0.74 to 0.99). Needless to say the last fit has to be looked upon with cautiousness since it is so
much dependent upon the figures of the 1929 crash.
4.2 Connection between interest spread and market’s uncertainty
In section 3 we interpreted the spread variable as characterizing the uncertainty and lack of confidence
existing in the market at a given moment. This interpretation was based on plausible arguments but
one would be on firmer ground if it could be supported by some statistical evidence. In this paragraph
we provide at least partial proof in that respect by comparing the changes of the spread variable to
the consumers’ lack of confidence as measured by standard surveys. This is shown in Fig. 2.; it
represents the spread variable along with the lack of confidence index in the United States in the
period before and after the 1987 crash. Changes in the two variables are fairly parallel although the
spread variable appears to be much more sensitive and displays larger fluctuations. In the two months
before the crash of 19 October 1987 both the uncertainty (measured by the spread variable) and the
lack of confidence (estimated through consumer surveys) increased by about 20%; after the crash
both variables increased rapidly; but the after-effects of the crash were short-lived and uncertainty
decreased after the beginning of 1988. If consumer confidence data could be found for the period
prior to World War II it would of course be interesting to perform a similar comparison for other
crashes.
5 Perspectives for an extension to other speculative markets
Relationships which have a validity extending over one century are not frequent either in economics
or in finance. Yet, if the above observation remains isolated it will be hardly more than a technical
feature of interest for stock market professionals. It is tempting to posit that an increase in uncertainty
can play a similar role in other speculative markets. Stock markets are certainly special in so far as
they are pure speculative markets; in contrast to property or commodities, stocks do not have any
other usage for their buyer than to earn dividends. Nevertheless the stock market seems to be in close
connection with the property market; historically stock market crashes have often been preceded by a
collapse of property prices; see in this respect [6, p.65] and [14, p.76]. One problem with the property
market is its long relaxation time. For that reason we consider here another case namely the market
for gold, silver and diamonds. As is well known, starting in 1977 huge speculative bubbles developed
in these items, which collapsed simultaneously in January 1980. Let us concentrate on the diamond
market since the gold market has already been closely investigated particularly by A. Johansen and D.
Sornette. In Fig.3 we represented the price of diamonds along with the consumer lack of confidence
index that we already used above. Two observations can be made (i) There is a huge increase in the
lack of confidence index between 1978 and the spring of 1980 that is to say during the period when
the bubble developed. This shows that it would be vain to explore the diamond market (or silver/gold
markets) in order to find specific causes for the collapse. It was most certainly triggered by exogenous,
psycho-sociological factors. (ii) In the phase between collapse and recovery (March 1980-March
1986), in contrast to what we observed with stock prices, there is no connection whatsoever between
diamond price changes and the fluctuations of the lack of confidence index. Perhaps the story would
be different if one could use a confidence index specially pertaining to the diamond market.
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Figure captions
Fig.1a Stock prices versus interest rate spread: 19th century crashes. Thick solid line: stock
price index on the NYSE normalized to 100 at its peak value (left-hand vertical scale); thick dashed
line: interest rate spread (right-hand vertical scale). The thin dashed line represents the interest rate
for high grade commercial paper; it serves as a control variable in order to determine whether it is
the spread or the interest rate which is the pivotal variable. For the purpose of facilitating comparison
the left-hand vertical scale is the same for all graphs: this allows a visual comparison of the crashes’
severity. The right-hand vertical scales although not identical are nevertheless comparable in the
sense that their overall ranges ymax/ymin are the same. The horizontal scales represent the number
of months after the crash; these scales are the same for all graphs. The numbers under the title are the
correlations price/spread and price/interest rate respectively. Sources: see text.
Fig.1b Stock prices versus interest rate spread: 20th century crashes. The caption is the same
as for Fig.1a; note however that for the 1929 chart the scales for the stock prices (right-hand vertical
scale), for the spread (left-hand vertical scale) and for time (horizontal scale) are not the same as for
the other charts. This clearly shows the exceptional magnitude of the crash of 1929. Sources: see
text.
Fig.2 Comparison between the spread variable and the consumer lack of confidence index
before the crash of October 1987. Changes in the spread variable (solid line) and in the lack of
confidence index (broken line) are fairly parallel but the first variable is much more sensitive. The lack
of confidence index is the inverse of the standard confidence index obtained from surveys. Sources:
Mishkin (1991), Gems and Gemology 24,140 (Fall 1998).
Fig.3 Comparison of the price of diamonds before the collapse of January 1980 with the
evolution of the lack of confidence index. In the months before the market collapse the lack of
confidence increased rapidly. However after the crash the lack of confidence index does not show the
same pattern that we observed in Fig.1. The outcome would perhaps be different if we could use a
confidence index focused on the diamond market. Sources: Gems and Gemology 24 (Fall 1998).
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